In Search of Genocide: A Comparison of Rwanda and South Africa

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A case of genocide—Rwanda—is compared to a case where genocide or great violence might have been expected to occur but did not—the change of regime in South Africa. It is proposed that one crucial difference between the cases is the difference between splitting and dividing groups. Whereas in Rwanda the Tutsi and the Hutu were systematically split since the Belgians used the Tutsi as surrogates to dominate the Hutu, in South Africa there was no systematic use of surrogates and hence no malignant splitting of the indigenous population. The technique of rule in South Africa was by division, which does not focus rage on any indigenous group. The psychology of splitting is discussed.

This article assesses the importance of the political and psychological splitting of subject populations in causing genocide and contrasts splitting and division. Political splitting goes beyond the mere division of subject populations: It is the process whereby one part of the subject population is made responsible for the disasters that befall the others. The use of surrogate rulers is particularly effective in producing splitting: The surrogates become the target of wrath when things go wrong. They are traitors. Political splitting results in psychological splitting because it is accomplished by ideological indoctrination as much as by coercive force. After independence, the same ideology that was used to make rulers of the surrogates can be used to make demons of them.

Splitting can be distinguished from another form of divide and rule, in which the subject populations are divided for administrative convenience as well as to prevent them from taking united action against their rulers. However, no group in the subject population is used to rule the others.

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When populations are divided to make it easier to rule them, they may still be united by their opposition to their rulers. This is a positive bond. Their historical opposition to each other, if any, is reduced by their shared opposition to the regime. Surrogates, on the other hand, become the targets of a hatred that combines opposition to the regime and any historical enmity that may already exist. To show that splitting is significantly different from division in causing genocide, we should undertake a number of case studies. One pair of case studies that shows the difference is the pair of Rwanda and South Africa.

In Rwanda, the Tutsi were systematically used by the Belgians to rule over the Hutu. In South Africa, the Black population was systematically divided, but no one group was used to rule the others. There were Blacks who accommodated to the National Party regime—headmen, civil servants, community councillors, members of the older generation whose status was challenged when young comrades seemed to be taking over everywhere, and migrant hostel dwellers who felt that they were outsiders among slick urban people, and these were targeted by revolutionaries—but they did not all belong to a particular ethnic group that was systematically used to rule over others. We thus have a contrast between splitting and division. One pair of case studies is a mere beginning, but it may show the way.

WHAT IS GENOCIDE?

The definition in Article II of the United Nations (UN) Convention on Genocide is a good basis, though it may be in need of some minor amendments. The Convention refers to “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” (p. 1). We can improve on this by adding “political” to the list of groups that might be targeted by genocides, by making it clear that “murder is the principal way in which groups are destroyed as such,” and by indicating that the perpetrators define the target group and its membership, as Chalk and Jonassohn (1990) contended. These remarks lead us to the following definition: Genocide is an attempt to destroy a group by murdering its members, the group and its membership being defined by the murderers. By extension, we might wish to refer to other measures (birth control, mass removals, or removing children), but the aforementioned definition is clear and covers what most people think of as genocide.

ASSUMPTIONS AND METHOD

National identity is often fragile. On the one hand, people may identify with the nation as a whole when confronting outsiders; on the other hand, there are many internal confrontations that call on opposing ethnic, racial, or religious identities.
Splitting occurs when a particular internal opposition overrides national identity. Splitting is a way of dealing with fear and anxiety, because the split-off others are held responsible for national catastrophes. Splitting happens in different ways from nation to nation, given different historical circumstances, but it always fulfills the important function of explaining misfortune as the work of an external agency.

Certain political arrangements can facilitate splitting. One of the most potent arrangements is the use of one section of a subject population to dominate another, as in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) under the British (Kuper, 1985), where Tamil were used to rule Sinhalese. Surrogate rule entrenches and reinforces historical rivalry. Those dominated direct their hatred at the surrogate rulers rather than at the people at the top, and the surrogates fear the people they are ruling because they know that they are their first targets.

Splitting may also occur when people are seen as being internal enemies of a nation because they are not contained by its geographical and social boundaries. They are "pretending" to be part of a nation while they belong to its enemies. Armenians were part of both the Ottoman and the Russian empires, which were traditional enemies (Walker, 1980). Jews were seen by Nazis as pretending to be loyal Germans while they were "really" Bolsheviks loyal to Russia or international financiers loyal to the Zionist conspiracy outlined in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Cohn, 1967). We can see this in Hitler's many speeches on the subject (Baynes, 1942).

The process leading from splitting to genocide is conceptualised as follows: Splitting is the essential condition, without which genocide will not occur. If there is no target, there is no genocide, but splitting must be accompanied by several enabling conditions for it to lead to genocide. This is not peculiar, because all social processes depend on sequences of enabling conditions. Investment, to take an example, may be the first essential step toward economic production, but many conditions must be satisfied before investment becomes production. Let us now look at the process of splitting and the enabling conditions.

In the process of political splitting, administrative and ideological measures accompany each other, because coercion is seldom enough to accomplish political results. Somebody has to be convinced that the measures are necessary, and the supreme artists of persuasion will always devote as much attention to propaganda as to force (Hitler, 1939). In Rwanda the ideological split had commenced before the Belgians arrived. Anthropologists, starting with the work of Speke (1864/1949), found differences between the Tutsi and the Hutu that indicated Tutsi racial superiority. In South Africa on the other hand, White governments could rely on a long tradition of racial superiority—a tradition that accompanied the formation of Empire and that continued well into the 20th century. But they did not attempt to translate this into political measures to use surrogate groups. The fundamental barrier was between White and Black, and as this barrier weakened, the National Party devised a policy of multinationalism to replace it. What is significant for this
thesis is that this was a policy of division and not of splitting, where splitting means that some surrogate group is set up to rule over the rest. After some tentative experiments with surrogates that will be discussed later, the National Party began abandoning the dominant position as fast as it could, until in the end it chose to surrender power rather than hold on to it. Fortunately, because such surrogates are the first targets of vengeance, these experiments failed. What we see in both the Rwandan and the South African cases is the essential (and obvious) complementarity of policy and ideology. Ideology is the psychological instrument of policy, but this psychological instrument will only spread as an active belief system under the enabling conditions outlined next.

The first enabling condition for genocide is loss of power, which exposes surrogate rulers to their enemies. This is the time of seizing property and positions, and it gives those who replace their victims a strong interest in keeping them out, if not in killing them.

The second enabling condition is catastrophe, most commonly economic collapse and/or military defeat. The state fails and people look for explanations. Genocidal parties are able to convince many that certain groups are responsible. Surrogate rulers are particularly vulnerable, though it does not follow that the use of surrogates is the only possible way of splitting off groups.

The third enabling condition is war, which arouses strong emotions, calls for strong measures, and permits secrecy.

Finally, the move toward genocide has to be taken by some party. Without a genocidal party, there will be no genocide.

Every account of a complex political event must take into account both process and strategy. Some agent must respond to events.

Given that genocides are complex social events, how should we study them? The indispensable method, for all its problems, is comparative case study.

Early case studies should be used to develop hypotheses that can be tested in yet further case studies. In this way, studies become increasingly theory driven. Genocidal and other extremely violent movements are favoured by sets of clearly identifiable circumstances (Littell 1988; Melson, 1989). There are already many case studies of genocide (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Du Preez, 1994; Hovanissian, 1986; Kuper, 1981, 1985; Staub, 1989) that can be fruitful sources of hypotheses. This study is an attempt to use case histories to test a hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis to be tested is that political and psychological splitting of subject populations by the use of surrogate rulers is more likely to lead to genocide than is division. Splitting produces external agents who can be held responsible for difficulties and disasters.
Splitting is the essential condition for genocide, but it is not sufficient. For genocide to occur, there must be enabling conditions, of which the following are the most important: (a) the victims must be vulnerable or become vulnerable—for example, by loss of power; (b) catastrophe, usually economic; and (c) war. Enabling conditions lead from splitting off to genocide in the following way: They enable genocidal ideas to spread because these ideas seem to offer both explanation and remedy under desperate circumstances and they enable genocidal parties to act by making moderate forces seem irrelevant and weak.

It follows from our view of genocide as a process that it never emerges in complete form all at once, or after only one of the steps outlined earlier. The Nazis split off the Jews in the 1930s (a legal expression of this was the Nuremberg racial laws) and began developing genocidal concepts, such as the medicalised killing of mentally ill and retarded persons (Friedlander, 1996; Lifton, 1986) well before they perfected the full concept of the “final solution” and plans for executing it (Hilberg, 1985). We should, therefore, look at genocide as a historical process from splitting to execution, if we wish to understand it.

CASE STUDIES: RWANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA

The Structure of the Case Studies

Our first move is to depict the nature of the psychological split between different groups by looking at the ways that identities became incompatible. The second move will be to look at the enabling conditions—loss of power, economic catastrophe, and war—that increased rage and provided the opportunities for the genocidal party to act.

Splitting and Loss of Power

Splitting creates incompatible identities. In the strongest case, the one implies the elimination of the other. The most notorious example is the relation between Aryan and Jew in Nazi theory. In Mein Kampf (Hitler, 1939), Hitler wrote that if the Jew triumphed, the planet would sail empty of all life through the ether. He meant that Jews may look like human beings but are not.

In Rwanda, the incompatible identities of Hutu and Tutsi derived from the belief, nurtured by the Belgian colonial government, that Tutsi originated as invaders. The postindependence extrapolation was that they were still invaders who sheltered in neighbouring territories and used the army of the Rwanda Patriotic Front to attack Hutu. Speke’s (1864/1949) theory was that the Tutsi were descendants of the “Hamitic branch of the Caucasian race” who had moved south from Ethiopia and
conquered the "Bantu" Hutu, bringing a sophisticated civilisation with them (Sanders, 1969). The Tutsi were supposed to be taller and more intelligent than the Hutu. Their identity was fixed in a 1930s census, when everyone who had 10 cattle or more was classified Tutsi and everyone with less became Hutu.

Under the Belgians, to be Tutsi was to be privileged, educated, and advanced. Some statistics may show this. In the Nyenza School for the Sons of Chiefs, all 349 students were Tutsi and even after the moves to independence had been initiated, over 90% of the administrative posts were held by Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1970). After independence, the whole condition was reversed. They were in the minority and democratic elections deprived them of power. Hutu extremists adopted the story that Tutsi were foreign invaders, giving it their own twist. What had been noble became despicable. The Rwanda Patriotic Front, and by extension all Tutsi, were referred to in radio RTLM broadcasts as "cockroaches" (Hilsum, 1994a). In hundreds of conversations with Hutu refugees after the war, Block found little evidence that people believed anything wrong had been done. Tutsi were identified with the invading Rwanda Patriotic Front force and therefore deserved what they got. Hutu refugees "not only refused to reject the leadership that had urged them to kill but sincerely believed that their own survival depended on killing" (Block, 1994). The extremist version of the Hutu/Tutsi identity was an "either/or" philosophy—"kill or be killed." "The people you call victims were the ones responsible" (Block, p.7). The extremist journal Kangura proclaimed that Hutu and Tutsi should not intermarry, Hutu and Tutsi should not be friends, and Hutu should not show mercy to Tutsi ("The Hutu Ten Commandments," cited by De Waal & Omaar, 1994). The identities negated each other, because the existence of one necessarily led to the destruction of the other.

Symptomatic of the completeness of the splitting is a report issued by a commission of the Ministry of Defence on "Definition and Identification of the Enemy." The list of enemies is long and comprehensive. It includes Tutsi who wanted to take power in Rwanda, Hutu who sympathised with Tutsi, Hutu dissatisfied with the present government, the unemployed, foreigners with Tutsi wives, the "Nilo-Hamitic" people of the region (Tutsi by another name), activists who deflected public attention from ethnic differences to socioeconomic differences, and newspapers and cultural associations that drew international attention to human rights abuses in Rwanda (De Waal & Omaar, 1994). Even more drastic was the repeated message that the social revolution of 1959 had not been completed because Tutsi had been allowed to escape abroad and their children were now the threat. The implication was clear and was spelt out to the militia—kill the children as well as the adults. The genocide was preemptive.

In South Africa, the creation of incompatible identities was not as systematic as it had been in Rwanda. South Africa was construed in grand apartheid ideology as a multinational state, and homelands were created to implement this concept. According to this theory, Whites were merely one nation among others, even if they
did rule over 87% of the territory. The theory allowed for at least a token equality between the different “nations” of South Africa.

A target for hatred and violence might have been created in South Africa if a particular group of the oppressed, such as Coloureds or Indians, had been co-opted by Whites to govern the rest. It was the good fortune of all to be almost equally oppressed. The attempt to gather Indians, Coloureds, and Whites together in a tricameral parliament in 1984 was too late to counter the unifying effects of the United Democratic Front (UDF), established at the same time to resist this move. The elections, with an official poll of 30.9%, succeeded primarily as a psychodrama of the unity of the struggle against apartheid. The founding rally of the UDF in 1983 attracted representatives of over 300 affiliated organisations in a massive show of strength. In the interests of unity, it had been decided to ignore ideological differences between socialists and capitalists. What united everybody was their opposition to racism and the apartheid regime, as well as to British, German, and American imperialism. The major groups were from Alexandra, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Soweto, but there were miniature bands such as the Afikaner Demokrate, Jews for Justice, and the Mowbray Inter-Racial Group. The curious feature of all this was that the ad hoc nonracial UDF ended up with many “ethnic group” representatives. Even more curious was the fact that this ramshackle machine took on the ideological purists of the Azanian People’s Organization and the National Party government and eventually won, despite all its internal contradictions. It could only do so because the core of the movement was the largest, best organised, and most coherent nonracial party of all—the ANC, invisible because it had been banned and could not reveal itself. The UDF was reputed to have over 600,000 members, an annual budget of two million rands, and donations of two hundred millions from a variety of national and international sources to affiliates (Gottschalk, 1994). The purists had not succeeded in making the struggle for and against apartheid a struggle between White and Black, or between one exclusive ideology and another. The somewhat illogical structure of the UDF was a sign of tolerance and a willingness to absorb all who wished to belong.

Yet there is one indication—the struggle between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)—of a serious political split in South Africa. This struggle has been accompanied by many ruthless massacres. The most visible early sign of this struggle was the exclusion of Buthelezi and Inkatha from the UDF on the flimsy grounds that Inkatha was a Bantustan institution. The logic is easily demolished, because parties from Bophutatswana and KaNgwane were accepted. The real reason for excluding Buthelezi is probably that he challenged the ANC in Natal. He was a powerful rival. Buthelezi had entered homeland politics with the support of the ANC, but after that he began to make moves that alienated him from the struggle against the National Party government. One of his major moves was to oppose economic sanctions, but there were many other divisive moves, ranging from the creation of a conservative trade union to his contrast
between the "real" political struggle inside the country and the "Disneyland" world of the ANC exiles (Maré and Hamilton, 1987). There was also an "Inkathagate" scandal in 1991 that revealed that Inkatha was receiving government funding. Even more serious is the story that emerged from an indictment of senior military officers, including former Minister of Defence Magnus Malan. Buthelezi approached the government in 1985 for help in protecting himself against the United Democratic Front, in effect the ANC, which was gaining strength in Natal. The State Security Council decided to launch a campaign of destabilisation against the UDF, similar to its campaign against Renamo in Mozambique, and trained 200 Inkatha men who were posted to police stations to became the nucleus of Inkatha hit squads (Sparks, 1995). The trial of the military has revealed collaboration between the National Party government and Inkatha to undermine the ANC. Though the struggle for power explains much of the bitterness between the ANC and the IFP, there is an additional venom that may be due to the feeling that the IFP has betrayed the struggle against apartheid by seeking the assistance of the common enemy.

Yet the split between the ANC and Inkatha has only some features of the split in Rwanda, and for this reason has not exploded into large scale massacre. Inkatha members were not systematically used by the National Party to rule over others; nor has there been war to facilitate killing. In the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 up till September, political murder in KwaZulu-Natal, the scene of most—though not all—of the ANC/IFP conflict, accounted for 39% (1,489), 60% (1,464), and 64% (531), respectively, of the political killings in South Africa (Linscott, 1995). Yet the numbers are comparatively small. Violence has been limited by the fact that the parties are in a stalemate position, as shown by both the national elections of 1994 and the regional elections of 1996. Though the ANC dominates the cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the IFP dominates the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal; and neither the ANC nor the IFP has been able to improve its share of the regional vote (ANC 32% in 1994 national elections, 33% in 1996 regional elections; IFP 50% in 1994, 45% in 1996). The IFP has lost voters to the National Party, the Democratic Party, and Independents, but not to the ANC (Silke, 1996). To date, the struggle has not spun out of control, largely because of the disparity in the strength of the two parties as clearly shown in the national elections of 1994 when the ANC won 62.6% of the national vote and the IFP 10.5%. The recent election stalemate will act as a further brake, because it shows that the IFP does not have the clear majority that might tempt it to go it alone.

In South Africa, there were several smaller split-off groups that were both the perpetrators and the victims of extreme violence. They fall into the pattern remarked on in this article, because they were surrogates in the exercise of power. Every colonial or settler regime uses indigenous surrogates to rule. The Rwandan case was merely exceptionally systematic. In South Africa, the struggle between the "comrades" supporting the new regime and the vigilantes, "fathers," "mabangalala," or "witdoeke" supporting the old regime was intense and often without
mercy. Isolated enemies were massacred and sometimes “necklaced” (Haysom, 1986), but no general ethnic or class enemy was split off and targeted. This can be done if the ideological climate is ripe, as it was in the Cambodian targeting of “bourgeoisie” and the Soviet targeting of a succession of class enemies such as aristocrats, bourgeoisie, and Kulaks. In South Africa, the ideological climate was “ethnic conflict” and not “class conflict,” given the fortunate collapse of the Soviet Union, with the result that ethnic targets were not immediately available.

It may seem that we are leaving the major actors, Nationalists in particular and Whites in general, out of the reckoning. Surely they can be targeted for genocide? Surely, in long centuries of domination, they have split themselves off from those they dominated? All this is true, yet there are several ways that the split has been reduced, at least for the moment. The first healing process is that many Whites participated in the struggle or supported it. Some have attained leading positions in the ANC. In addition, Black leaders in the ANC were supported by European powers during the period of exile. This probably reduced their antagonism to Whites as such, though it will not have reduced their antagonism to the National Party. The third healing process is that, during the period of negotiated transition, Whites were seen to voluntarily hand over power. The present leaders, most notably Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, continued the work of reintegrating the nation to include both Blacks and Whites. Equally important is the absence of enabling factors, at the moment, to allow genocidal parties to flourish. Whites are still too powerful. Any attack on Whites would destroy the economy that the new regime depends on. Given that the other enabling conditions of genocide, such as catastrophe and war, are not present, we can rule out any immediate attack on Whites while at the same time recognising the conditions under which it might yet occur.

Economic Catastrophe and War

To understand what happened, it is necessary to plot the major events in Rwanda and Burundi and show how they interacted (Shackleton, 1994). Hutu in Rwanda perceived Tutsi moves in Burundi as a warning of what might happen if Tutsi were to gain control of Rwanda.

This is a very complex series of events. Let us try to summarise.

The shocks. The shocks immediately leading up to the fatal weakening of government in Rwanda were the collapse of coffee price (1989), war with Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF; 1990), massacre of Hutu in Burundi (1993), the naming of the offenders in human rights reports (1992, 1993), and the murder of Habyarimana (1994).
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<tr>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
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<td>1959: Death of king</td>
<td>1962: Independence</td>
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<td>10,000 Tutsi killed</td>
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<td>1962: Independence</td>
<td>1972: 100,000 Hutu massacred</td>
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<td>1963: Tutsi guerilla attack</td>
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<td>Hutu retaliate—10,000 Tutsi killed; 20 leaders executed</td>
<td>1973: Hutu purged from educational institutions Habyarimana Coup</td>
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<td>1972: 100,000 Hutu massacred</td>
<td>1988: 5,000 Hutu massacred</td>
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<td>1973: Hutu purged from educational institutions Habyarimana Coup</td>
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<td>1989: Coffee price colapse</td>
<td>1993: Burundi’s first democratic elections</td>
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<td>1990: RPF (Exiles) invade</td>
<td>Coup: 50–100,000 killed</td>
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<td>Civilians massacred by RPF and government</td>
<td>New elections: Ntaryamira elected</td>
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<td>1 million Rwandans displaced by 1993</td>
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<td>1992: Hutu extremist militias</td>
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<td>1992–3: Human rights reports name offenders</td>
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**The squeeze.**  The government was squeezed between, on the one hand, aid donors and the UN pressing for accountability and reform and, on the other hand, Hutu extremists of the Committee for the Defence of the Republic (CDR) fearing loss of position, wealth, and power. The danger of the situation is summarised by De Waal and Omaar (1994): “The economic prosperity of the country was shattered in a little over a year, between September 1989 and October 1990, the period between the collapse of the coffee price and invasion by the RPF.”

In South Africa, there has been neither economic catastrophe nor war since the ending of the Angolan war in 1988. Should these occur, we can expect a resurgence of violent parties.

**The solution.**  The solution was to point out that the Tutsi were the danger. They had the land, dominated commerce, and were plotting to take over the country by launching attacks from neighbouring territories and by causing their chief enemies to be listed as human rights offenders. The extremist Hutu militias were on hand to deal with the matter after the murder of the President.
**Genocidal party.** Genocide cannot occur without the seizure of power by a genocidal party. Hilsum (1944b) wrote that “none of this (the killing) was spontaneous. It was all organised. It was a plan, the Final Solution developed by Hutu extremists allied to the late President. ... That was why the killing started immediately and why the radio station had lists of targets” (p. 8). An extremist movement, the CDR, was formed by the ruling party, specifically to do the dirty work that the ruling party could not be seen to do. Even when militias were apparently suspended at the time of the Arusha Accords, they were allowed to retain their weapons. They were ready to execute the policy of genocide and to attack the targets identified by the army: Tutsi, Hutu who were dissatisfied with the government, human rights workers.

Secondly, preparation of political paranoia had been thorough, using the private radio station RTLM, and Kangura, the publication previously mentioned. Their purpose was to incite hatred and to persuade Hutu not to accept the movement toward democracy agreed to in the Arusha accord. Something of the flavour of the paper is conveyed by this extract from page 5 of issue number 47:

You Hutus who re-possessed your property in 1959 when the cockroaches fled, you’d better beware ... the peace accord is allowing the cockroaches to come back to seize their property. Hutus, you will be injected with syringes full of AIDS viruses because the peace accord gave the ministry of health to the cockroaches (Mugenzi, 1994).

In South Africa, there are several extremist parties—some of which might have developed into genocidal parties had they gained power—but they remained at the margin. Some were mere splinters, such as the Wit Wolwe, the Wit Kommando, the Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging, and the National Forum (O’Maolain, 1987). Others, such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, are more significant but played their cards badly. The Pan-Africanist Congress movement, with its notorious “one settler one bullet,” might well have been dangerous in power. However none of these parties succeeded in gaining more than a fraction of the support they needed to succeed. Why? Conditions did not favour them, but equally important was the fact that the moderates in the NP and the ANC effectively negotiated a transition. Had they not, the dogs of war would have been unleashed and the extremists would have been extremely dangerous. It is for this reason that the strategies of both genocidal and other parties must be emphasised in explaining events. Mechanisms or causal sequences are not sufficient.

**Some precipitating events.** Hutu fears were intensified by the very people who were attempting to persuade them to share power. An International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations had visited Rwanda and published a report naming persons responsible for killings. It concluded that “Authorities at the
highest level, including the President of the Republic, have consented to these abuses” (De Waal & Omaar, 1994, p. 18). This was well-meaning, honest, and foolish. How could the named politicians and high-ranking officials be expected to cooperate in a surrender of power that would deliver them into the hands of enemies they feared and hated? In South Africa, on the other hand, negotiations proceeded on the assumption that past crimes would not be punished if amnesty had been applied for. Oblivion may be less complete than the National Party negotiators hoped for, but in any case, there was no premature identification of those responsible for atrocities to block the transition.

**Easing the way.** In Rwanda, the international arms industry played a facilitative role, backed by governments anxious for trade. Credits were extended, weapons were supplied, and scruples were exhibited (by Belgium) only once the war had actually begun (Goose & Smyth, 1994; Smyth, 1994).

**Outbreak.** When violence broke out, the UN force of 2,500 was unable or unwilling to intervene. The Presidential Guard, the army, and the militias rapidly established roadblocks in the city and began to hunt for the opposition. The Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyamane, was dragged from a UN compound and murdered with machetes. After killing political leaders, the massacre of human rights workers, Hutu who were too sympathetic to Tutsi, and ordinary Tutsi began (De Waal & Omaar, 1994). The failure of the UN was complete. UN agencies were not even allowed to evacuate their Rwandan employees, many of whom were murdered (Hilsum, 1994b). The UN had no intelligence, because it did not breach blockades. It had no focus, because its commander spent his time trying to get the exile army of the RPF and the Rwandan army to negotiate a cease-fire, even though the first problem was not fighting between the armies but the murder of civilians. It is clear that in a period of bitter and merciless local wars the role of the UN will have to be rethought.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The case histories presented are a test, though weak, of the hypothesis that splitting plays an essential role in genocide, and that splitting can be distinguished from division. When indigenous people are used as surrogates, they are seen as insider enemies who can never be trusted. Insider enemies are repeatedly split off from the population at large and targeted for violence during hard times.

The main targets—Tutsi, Jews, Armenians, the bourgeoisie of Cambodia, Kulaks in the Soviet Union—have “infiltrated” and “betrayed” the genocidal group.
Relations with straightforward enemies or oppressors are often relatively friendly after conflict, whereas those who have betrayed are always regarded with a special hatred.

We should search for cases that differ markedly on the critical variable of splitting and as little as possible on other variables. Particularly interesting cases would have all the enabling conditions present (loss of power, catastrophe, war) but no target group. Even under these conditions, our prediction would be that there would be no genocide.

When colonial powers withdraw, there are often bloody struggles for domination. Particularly vicious examples of postindependence struggles are the partition of India after British withdrawal (Kuper, 1981), the Biafran War in Nigeria (Forsyth, 1969), postindependence wars in the Congo (Colvin, 1968), the war in Mozambique (Maer & de Waal, 1993; Minter, 1994), the continuing struggles between Tamil rebels against the government of Sri Lanka (Kuper, 1985), and Indonesian attempts to subjugate East Timor (Taylor, 1992).

These are bloody, but they are not obviously genocidal, because they stop short of attempts to eliminate entire peoples. Yet there are genocidal elements in some of these wars that could test the theory advanced here. There may not be genocides of the major groups, but there are sometimes attempts to kill off smaller groups. Friedlander (1996) draws our attention to the fact that the Nazi genocide was aimed at three groups: the handicapped, the gypsies, and the Jews. The more obvious genocides often mask the less obvious. Yet the less obvious cases are as good a test of the hypothesis that splitting is the essential precondition of genocide as the more obvious and notorious cases are. In our search for genocidal cases, we should include the smaller as well as the larger.

There are some grounds for satisfaction in South Africa, because the leadership of both the African National Congress and the National Party rescued the country from a rapidly accelerating conflict, but there can be no grounds for complacency. We should be continually vigilant in preventing attempts to split off groups and hold them responsible for whatever goes wrong, though such splits are often emotionally and even morally satisfying. When things go badly, split-off groups are available for targeting. The time to prevent splitting is before things go badly.

There are two further implications to which I wish to draw attention. The first is the avoidance of political arrangements that produce splitting. Unfortunately, surrogates may be used precisely because their exposure ensures their loyalty. Perhaps the best that can be done is to warn those preparing for independence of the special danger to which split-off groups are exposed. The second is the need for careful preparation of UN forces before sending them to difficult situations. There is a confusion of roles (military intervention or conflict resolution) and inadequate training for these roles. Troops are often totally unprepared for the situation in which they find themselves. In Rwanda, this unpreparedness reached ludicrous proportions because the force was drawn from about 20 different countries, most spoke no French, and there was no common language.
REFERENCES


(Original work published 1864)